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Abstract: The main objective of this study was to find the most effective strategies to curb and eradicate 
corruption and improve water service delivery. The study also aimed to present the type, causes, and effects 
of corruption. A mixed-methods questionnaire survey design was used to collect quantitative and qualitative 
data. 220 questionnaires were distributed to providers and users of water services in Zimbabwe. 149 
respondents returned the completed questionnaires. Data were analysed using descriptive statistics and 
content analysis. The Analysis of Variance was used to test the significance of mean scores. The study 
revealed that corruption is highly prevalent in Zimbabwe. The main factors that cause corruption in the water 
sector are poor governance, economic hardship, and weak accountability. Corruption leads to economic 
stagnation and poor foreign investments. Organisations such as the Zimbabwe National Water Authority must 
improve systems and structures, enhance the auditing process, and educate staff on good ethical standards 
and effective governance to effectively fight against corruption and improve service delivery. They must also 
put in place strong governance and accountability frameworks and work closely with communities and policy 
makers to eradicate corruption. The availability of water should be the same across all the suburbs, and the 
country needs to adjust its water bill rates in line with regional rates. Service providers should make use of 
mobile technology to promote citizenry participation in sharing ideas and making decisions on water 
sustainability. This study reaffirms the need to fight corruption and improve water service delivery. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corruption is one of the most prevalent and least confronted challenges faced by public service institutions 
particularly in developing countries (Davies, 2004). Tizor (2009) observed that corruption in Zimbabwe had 
been normalisedin the public sector mainly due to economic problems. Civil servants go to work not only 
because they are paid wages but also because of the corrupt activities that enhance their paltry income. In 
water services, Sithole (2013) found that a client may pay a council worker in the form of a bribe to speed up 
a water reconnection or bribe to stop water disconnection for non-payment. As a result, the council is 
deprived of the funds that it could use to improve its service delivery.Bribery is one of the most common 
forms of corruption in the water sector. The water sector is characterised by several complex factors such as 
high demand for water services and monopoly, which increase the risk of corruption (Selamawit, 
2015).Corruption has been getting worse over the years in Zimbabwe. The country was ranked 154 out of 
175 countries by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 2016 (Transparency International, 2016). The 
major problem of corruption is that it cripples the developmental efforts of African countries (Ijewereme, 
2015). Seligson (2006) highlighted that corruption has serious effects on economic growth and democratic 
development. Corruption prevents potential investors from investing, distorts public expenditure, increases 
the cost of running businesses, the cost of governance and diverts resources from the poor to the rich among 
many other consequences (Ijewereme, 2015). Park & Blenkinsopp (2011) posited that reducing corruption 
must, therefore, be of urgent priority to governments. 
 
The main aim is to present empirical findings regarding the most effective strategies to curb and eradicate 
corruption and improve water service delivery. Also, the study aims to present the type, causes, and effects of 
corruption in the water sector. The study will also create greater awareness of corruption, improve 
transparency and accountability, and emphasise the need to tackle this pathological phenomenon. The most 
notable studies to highlight the need to research on corruption within the water sector include Hove & 
Tirimbori (2011), Makanyeza et al. (2013), and Sithole (2013). This current study is of great importance 
because it is conducting a research specifically on corruption in water services in Harare and aims to make 
specific recommendations that deal with corruption. 
 
Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies (ISSN: 2220-6140) 
Vol. 9, No. 5, pp. 43-56, October 2017  
44 
 
Background to Study: The World Bank (1997) defined corruption in detail as an illicit behaviour by officials 
in the private and public domain in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves by abusing their 
job positions and misusing public power entrusted to them. This often leads to the embezzlement of funds, 
theft of corporate or public property, kickbacks in public procurement, nepotism as well as corrupt practices 
such as bribery, and extortion (Svensson, 2005). Van der Merwe (2006) argued that the abuse of public 
power is viewed as behavioural or structural. The behaviouraldimension refers to corruption committed by 
individuals or group of individuals through bribery, fraud and other forms of corrupt behaviour.This is 
referred to as personally corrupt behaviour because it benefits individuals, normally at the cost of an 
organisation (Banfield, 1975). The structural dimension refers to social, economic structures and processes in 
which corruption occurs (Van der Merwe, 2006). State enterprises and parastatals facilitate service delivery 
to both the public and corporate institutions and thus, influence economic activities and growth in various 
sectors (Moyo, 2012). According to Nsereko & Kebonang (2005), aservice delivery of water, electricity, health, 
education, and housing is crucial to the growth and development of African economies. However, Makanyeza 
et al. (2013) discovered that corruption and lack of accountability and transparency were among the main 
causes of poor service delivery. Selamawit (2015) argues that lack of awareness, commitment, and 
understanding to apply anticorruption methods are some of the obstaclesfaced in fighting against corruption 
in the water sector. Attempts to improve water service delivery in Zimbabwe have been unsatisfactory mainly 
because of the water shortages that are prevalent across the country. Quite often, most suburbs in Harare do 
not have running water on weekends dueto either shortages or repairs (Nherera, 2016). 
 
Water service availability is better in western suburbs than in eastern suburbs in Zimbabwe (Hove & 
Tirimboi, 2011). Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) argues that a substantial amount of unpaid 
water bills by individuals, mines, agricultural estates, government departments and local authorities are 
crippling the operations of the parastatal and preventing equitable access to essential water by all 
(Muvundusi, 2015). The Zimbabwean government's efforts to provide clean and efficient water supplies have 
been marred by allegations of corruption and lack of transparency. To date, debates on how best to improve 
efficiency and reliability of water supplies, while curbing corruption, are still raging on (Sithole, 2013). 
Selamawit (2015) suggested the involvement of the community, the private sector, and civil societyto 
collectively fight corruption and minimise the monopolistic nature of the service. 
 
Research Questions: Defined questions make it possible to find evidence-based solutions to the problem of 
corruption in the water services (Davies, 2011). Question 1 is the main research question. Questions 2 to 5 
are the sub-questions that this study is attempting to answer. 
 What are the most effective strategies to curb and eradicate corruption and improve water service 
delivery? 
 Which types of corruption are the most common in the water sector? 
 What factors or circumstances influence corruption in the water sector? 
 What are the effects or consequences of corruption? 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Theories of Corruption: Corruption is characterised by a range of factors such as economic and social and is 
the result of dynamic relationships between individuals, groups, institutions, the private sector, the public 
sector and the state (Department for International Development, 2015). It is for this reason that Breit et al. 
(2015) believed that undertaking more theoretical reflections on corruption can help to understand the 
meaning of it as well as findbetter ways to eradicate it. Marquette & Peiffer (2015) also suggested that anti-
corruption interventions need to better understand, from a theoretical perspective, why corruption can be 
usedby people as a problem-solving approach, particularly in weak institutional environments. According to 
Persson et al. (2013), the principal-agent theory explains the conflict that arises between principals who look 
after the public interest and agents who engage in corrupt activities. Booth (2012) observed that with this 
theory, agents undermine the principal’s interest in pursuit of their interests through corruption. A principal 
is unable to monitor an agent effectively, normally due to lack of information. Chakrabarti (2000) tested the 
agent-based theory of corruption and found that corruption at the individual level leads to corruption at a 
societal level. 
 
Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies (ISSN: 2220-6140) 
Vol. 9, No. 5, pp. 43-56, October 2017  
45 
 
The predominant theoretical approach to corruption has always been based on a principal-agent model 
discussed above. More recently, corruption has been viewed from a collective action perspective, whereby all 
stakeholders including bureaucrats, rulers, and citizens are participants of corruption (Department for 
International Development, 2015). These stakeholders weigh the rewards and costs of corruption such that, 
for example, a citizen may be corrupt because the costs of not being corrupt or acting in a more principled 
manner far outweigh the benefits (Persson et al., 2013). A collective action theory purports that the same 
corrupt behaviour and decisions made by individuals occur but within a wider society. When corruption 
occurs collectively, it becomes systemically pervasive and difficult to monitor and control as people may lack 
the will to act (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). The public choice theory is when an official makes a choice to act 
corruptly, and the organisational culture theory is when a group culture and aspects of the workplace 
encourage an official to act corruptly (De Graaf, 2007). 
 
Forms of Corruption: Corruption exists in many forms at various levels of service delivery. Corruption 
normally occurs in the form of embezzlement, procurement scam, extortion, bribery, fraud, kickback, gifts 
and tips, nepotism and tribalism in recruitment, appointment, or promotion, misappropriation of public 
funds, institutionalized, and leaking tender information to friends and relatives (Nsereko & Kebonang, 2005; 
Ijewereme, 2015; Selamawit, 2015). In Zimbabwe, Makumbe (2011)found that bribery is the most common 
form of corruption whereas extortion is the least form of corruption.Bribery is payment in the form of money 
or kind given to or taken by state officials engaged in corrupt activities (Selamawit, 2015). Davies (2004) 
found that clients were paying bribes directly to employees from as little as US$2 for a repair request to 
US$22 for a new connection. Seligson (2006) argues that some bribe payers may not be victims as they 
claimsince they willingly participant in such transactions to advance their aims.  
 
Causes of Corruption: Corruption is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon characterised by a range of 
economic, political, administrative, social and cultural factors as shown in Table 1. Centralisation of power, 
poor governance, weak accountability and incomplete economic liberalisation enable and foment corruption 
(Mills, 2012; Department for International Development, 2015). Treisman (2000) established some 
hypotheses which state that corruption is typically lower in democratic and, or economically developed 
countries, and countries with a freer press and more vigorous civic associations. Corruption is higher in 
countries with greater political instability. Furthermore, corruption is typically lower in countries with 
common law systems. According to Saki & Chiware (2007), Zimbabwe’s legal system is made up of common 
law as well as customary and legislation law.In that light, we will establish whether the hypotheses by 
Treisman (2000) hold in the case of Zimbabwe.Goel & Nelson (2008) also found that countries using 
acommon-law system seem to have lower corruption. This is because a legal framework provides a 
systematic set of auditing as well as severe repercussions for people involved. They also discovered that 
economic prosperity and democratic tendencies in a country leads to lower corruption. 
 
Table 1: Factors which optimise the occurrence of corruption 
Poor governance Weak accountability 
Individual beliefs Low salaries 
Addiction of alcohol/drugs/gambling Democratic countries 
Employee dissatisfaction Legal system 
Work pressures Political instability 
Source: Treisman (2000); Mills (2012) and Department for International Development (2015) 
 
Causes of Poor Service Delivery: Makanyeza et al. (2013) discovered that corruption and lack of 
accountability and transparency were among the main causes of poor service delivery. The other major 
causes were councillor interference, political manipulation, poor human resource policy, lack of employee 
capacity, inadequate citizen participation, substandard planning, and poor monitoring and evaluation. Mtisis 
(2008) found that the underlying causes hindering the provision of clean water to Zimbabwe’s urban areas 
include corruption, economic stagnation, political interference, population growth, dilapidation in water 
infrastructure, and not following water quality standards and laws. Of importance were the findings by Hove 
& Tirimbori (2011) who found that poor water service delivery was mainly due to low production and high 
non-revenue water, which stood at almost 40 percent. In addition, lack of a satisfactory regulatory board 
which can deal with residents’ complaints on water issues affecting them is a major factor. Lastly, water bills 
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in Zimbabwe were higher when benchmarked against those of developed and developing countries, which 
made some residents struggle to pay their monthly bills. 
 
Effects of Corruption: The common effects of corruption in the water sector are worsening poverty, reduced 
productivity, poor quality of service and lack of accountability and transparency (Selamawit, 2015). 
Corruption undermines the provision of clean water and effective water service delivery (Mtisis, 2008) and 
stalls progress towards an inclusive society, both economically and socially (Nsereko & Kebonang, 2005). 
According to Hove & Tirimbori (2011), poor water service delivery in Harare saw residents getting supplied 
with only a third of the total demand, consequently forcing residents to use unhygienic strategies such as 
drinking water from unsafe boreholes. In the past, unrelenting water problems have brought the cholera 
epidemics that led to many people dying from using contaminated water. Corruption is a stumbling block to 
Zimbabwe’s development as well as Southern African Development Community (SADC) region’s 
development. Corruption in one country exacerbates all the other problems that beset the region. Corruption 
has a negative impact on the well-being and welfare of the general populace (Nsereko & Kebonang, 2005), as 
its effects include the abuse of national resources, underdevelopment, high unemployment and poor standard 
of service delivery (Ijewereme, 2015). 
 
Figure 1: Corruption Perception Index ranking against ZSE Mining Index 
 
Authors’ figure using data from ZSE and Transparency International (2016) 
 
Figure 1 shows a steep downward trend for the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) Mining Index and a 
relatively upward trend for Zimbabwe's corruption rating. As corruption has been getting worse, the index 
has also been increasingly performing badly. Zimbabwe was ranked 71 in 2002, 107 in 2005, 146 in 2009 and 
154 in 2016 for corruption. On the other hand, the yearly averaged price of the ZSE Mining Index was US$192 
in 2009, US$87 in 2012, US$56 in 2014 and US$28 in 2016. We could not compute the prices of the index 
from 2002 to 2008 because they were quoted in Zimbabwean dollars and part of that period had 
hyperinflation. We argue that corruption is one of the main factors influencing the underperformance of the 
index because investors become bearish and risk averse in sectors or countries with rampant corruption. Our 
argument is supported by the findings ofTransformation Index (2016) who found that the mining sector in 
Zimbabwe is particularly affected by high-level corruption and patronage. Selamawit (2015) postulated that 
corruption in the public service prevents both domestic and foreign investors from investing in an economy. 
This is because corruption erodes trust and confidence of a nation (Seligson, 2006). Davies (2004) also found 
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that corruption stifles development opportunities available to developing countries as investments become 
less productive and the cost of capital increases. 
 
Strategies to Curb Corruption & Improve Service Delivery: The fight againstcorruption requires well-
coordinated efforts and teamwork from all stakeholders, including the community and civil society groups 
(Selamawit, 2015). According to Mills (2012, p.1), “social psychology, organisational theory, social theory, 
business ethics, criminology and behavioural economics, among others, all have something to offer the 
corruption prevention endeavour”. Employing information technology to decrease discretion, engaging non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and communities to monitor projects (Davies, 2004), ensuring customers 
participate in the decision-making process and improving systems and structures are some of the strategies 
that can be used to reduce incidences of corruption (Selamawit, 2015). Ncube & Maunganidze (2014) 
concurred by suggesting that maintaining good ethical standards and good governance should make leaders 
in parastatals positively turn the fortunes of the country. Countries need leaders of substance who possess 
good leadership qualities and unbridled commitment to public good. If leaders are not trustworthy, this will 
cascade to the bottom of the organisation and lead to a decline in the business as well as the country’s 
economy. The management of Harare City Council (HCC) rewarded itself hefty salaries and allowances 
despite poor water service delivery, a poor economic performance (Ncube & Maunganidze, 2014) and paltry 
employee income (Zhou, 2012). 
 
Auditing can help to curb corruption because auditors can take appropriate action if they find facts which 
give them areason to believe that a corrupt activity amounting to an irregularity has been committed. The 
possible effects of the corrupt activity will also be documentedin the audit report (Labuschagne & Els, 2006). 
Unfortunately, Bussell (2010) found that policy initiatives intended to reduce corruption are least likely to be 
implemented in countries that have high levels of corruption. Dealing with corruption is one way of 
improving water service delivery. The other primary strategies to improve service delivery include timely 
response to client complaints, partnership with the community, citizen participation in the affairs of the local 
authority, ensuring that clients pay their bills on time, strategic public service planning, solid human resource 
policy, outsourcing services, improving accountability, segregation of duties between councillors and 
management of the local authorities (Makanyeza et al., 2013). 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Research Method: This study used a mixed-methods questionnaire survey design to collect both qualitative 
and quantitative data. Two questionnaires with semi-structured (closed and open-ended) questionswere 
designed for service providers and service users within the water service sector in Zimbabwe. The qualitative 
approach aims to give a detailed description whereas the quantitative approach aims to explain what is 
observed with regards to corruption (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). 
 
Sampling Method& Sample Size: A total of 110 questionnaires were distributed to clients, and 110 
questionnaires to ZINWA staff based on anon-response rate of 10 percent. Clients were carefully chosen using 
the probability method known as stratified random sampling where each person of the target populace had 
anequal chance of being selected (Kelly et al., 2003). The sampling method used to select service providers 
was the non-random, purposive sampling method. Purposive sampling was used to purposely provide 
diverse perspectives and data on the issue of corruption from experienced ZINWA staff (Cresswell, 2007). 
The inclusion criteria for service users was that they should be aged over 20 years, homeowners or tenants 
responsible for paying water bills, and English literate. The inclusion criteria for staff was that they should be 
working for ZINWA, aged over 20 years, English literate, and with no formal disciplinary against 
corruption.The sample size of clients (n = 77) gave a response rate of 70 percent. The sample size of service 
providers (n = 72) gave a response rate of 65.4 percent. One of the disadvantages of using a questionnaire is 
that it can have low response rate (Synodinos, 2003). In this study, the relatively good response rates might 
have been a result of the simplicity of the questionnaires. Also, the potential problem of low response rates 
was initially addressed by clearly explaining the nature and purpose of the research to participants. 
Participants were also told of the estimated time to complete the questionnaire to encourage participation. 
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Data Collection: Aquestionnaire survey was used to collect rich data and assess the thoughtsand experiences 
of participants (Bryman & Bell, 2007). This data collection instrument had both close-ended Likert-type 
questions and open-ended questions targeted at staff and customers. This instrument collected both 
numerical and categorical data from respondents. The following literature played a crucial role in formulating 
the research questions and survey questions (Davies, 2004; Nsereko & Kebonang, 2005; Seligson, 2006; Hove 
& Tirimboi, 2011; Mills, 2012; Makanyeza, et al., 2013; Ncube & Maunganidze, 2014; Department for 
International Development, 2015; Ijewereme, 2015; Selamawit, 2015). 
 
Data Analysis: The Likert-type questions are best analysed using descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics 
were created by calculating a composite score (mean) for central tendency from the five Likert-type items (1 
= strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree) (Likert, 1932). The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test was used to 
test whether mean scores were significantly different from 3, the score for neutrality (Boone Jr & Boone, 
2012). A mean score below 3 and significantly different from 3 meant that the overall view of respondents 
was not neutral and was either closer to 1 for strong agreement or closer to 2 for just in agreement. A mean 
score above 3 and significantly different from 3 meant that the overall view of respondents was not neutral 
and was either closer to 4 for just in disagreement or 5 for strongly in disagreement. The qualitative data 
wereanalysed using content analysis. Content analysis is an approach which objectively and systematically 
identifies and summarises written or spoken communication into fewer content categories (Steve, 2001). 
 
Ethical Considerations: The study was approved by the University of South Africa (UNISA) Research Ethics 
Committee and by the management of Zimbabwe National Water Authority. Participants were provided with 
a questionnaire and a clear verbal explanation of the purpose of the study. They were not asked for their 
names to ensure confidentiality. Participants were assuredofconﬁdentiality and integrity and that they had 
the right to decline to participate or withdraw from the study at any time. Consent of staff and service users 
was implied from thereturn of the completed questionnaire. Other ethical principles adhered to in this study 
include honestly reporting data, methods, and results and avoiding careless errors. As emphasised by Resnick 
(2015), fairness, honesty, trust, respect, accountability, and making rational decisions were observed 
throughout the study. 
 
4. Results & Discussion 
 
Profile of Respondents: The profile of the service users and service providers with regards to gender, age 
and qualifications are summarised in Table 2.Most clients (55 percent) were males, and 45 percent were 
females. Much of service providers (64 percent) who participated in the survey were male, and 36 percent 
were female.Most of the clients (31 percent) who participated in the survey were in the group aged 20-29 
years, and the same proportion was in the group aged 30-39 years. About 21 percent of surveyed clients were 
aged 40-49 years, and 17 percent were above 50 years of age. The results indicate that majority of the service 
users are in their early adulthood. About half of the service providers surveyed were aged 30-39 years, 23 
percent were aged 40-49 years, 14 percent were aged 20-29 years, and 11 percent were above 50 years of 
age. The results indicate that majority of the staff at ZINWA are in their young and middle adulthood. 
 
Table 2: Main respondent characteristics (valid responses and %) 
 Clients  Service Providers  
 Frequency (n) Percentage 
(%) 
Frequency (n) Percentage 
(%) 
Gender     
Male 42 55 46 64 
Female 35 45 26 36 
Age     
20-29 24 31 10 14 
30-39 24 31 37 51 
40-49 16 21 17 23 
Above 50 13 17 8 11 
Qualifications     
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High school 13 17 4 6 
Diploma 27 35 22 31 
Bachelor’s degree 32 42 29 40 
Master’s degree 5 6 17 24 
 
Most of the surveyed clients (42 percent) had a first degree, 35 percent had a diploma, 17 percent had 
completed high school, and 6 percent had a Master’s degree. Many of the service providers (40 percent) had a 
first degree, 31 percent had a diploma, 24 percent had a Master’s degree, and 6 percent had completed high 
school. The results indicate that employees of ZINWA aremore educated as evidenced by more postgraduate 
studies, which is important in providing good quality service to the public. 
 
Availability of Water: High-density suburbs such as Glen View, Budiriro, and Ruwa have poor availability of 
water. The results in Figure 2 show that majority of clients (27 percent) did not have water for 8-14 days, 25 
percent did not have water for 1-7 days, 17 percent did not have water for 22-30 days, and 16 percent did not 
have water for 15-21 days per month. Overall, the average number of days that households did not receive 
water was 11 days per month. A minority of clients (15 percent) reported that they were not experiencing 
any water cuts. 
 
Figure 2: Number of days clients had no water per month 
 
 
Causes and Effects of Corruption: Clients and service providers were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they agreed with the statement that each identified risk factor contributes to a high level of corruption. As 
shown in Table 3, the ANOVA test revealed that clients were strongly in agreement with the suggestion that 
poor governance, economic hardship, weak accountability and low salaries contribute to high levels of 
corruption in the water sector since the mean scores were less than 2 and significantly below 3 (p 
value=0.000). The ANOVA test also revealed that service providers strongly agree that poor governance, 
weak accountability, economic hardship and employee discontent promote high corruption in the water 
sector since the mean scores were less than 2 and significantly below 3 (p value=0.000). 
 
Table 3: Views of respondents on factors that contribute to corruption 
 Clients  Service Providers  
 Mean of Likert 
scores 
p-value on 
statistical 
difference from 3 
Mean of Likert 
scores 
p-value on 
statistical 
difference from 3 
Poor Governance 1.60 0.000 1.76 0.000 
Economic hardship 1.62 0.000 1.65 0.000 
Weak Accountability 1.87 0.000 1.66 0.000 
Low Salaries 1.90 0.000 2.14 0.000 
Political Instability 2.31 0.000 2.24 0.000 
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Employee Dissatisfaction 2.32 0.000 1.87 0.000 
Work Pressure 3.62 0.000 3.32 0.011 
 
Clients also concurred that political instability and employee dissatisfaction contribute to high levels of 
corruption since mean scores from the ANOVA test were significantly less than 3. Service providers were also 
in agreement that low salaries and political instability contribute to high levels of corruption since mean 
scores from the ANOVA test were significantly less than 3. Clients and service providers disagreed with the 
suggestion that work pressure contributes to high levels of corruption since mean values from the ANOVA 
test where found to be significantly above 3.The results of this study are in line with the findings by the 
Department for International Development, (2015), Treisman (2000) and Mills (2012), who also found that 
poor governance, low salaries, economic hardship, weak accountability, political instability and employee 
dissatisfaction are factors that enable the occurrence of corruption.Porkess (2011) explained that work 
pressure does not necessarily lead to a corrupt culture, a reasoning which is shared by participants in this 
study. However, the author further asserts that work pressure can be a critical first step to corrupt behaviour 
if other conditions permit so. Once corrupt behaviour takes hold, it is difficult to control it and will have 
disruptive consequences to service delivery and the business. 
 
Service providers were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement that each 
identified effect of corruption had the suggested effect. Mean scores less than 2 and p-values much less 0.05 
from the ANOVA test revealed that service providers strongly agreed with the view that corruption has a 
negative effect on economic growth, potential investors, costs of running businesses, public expenditure, 
quality of service and worsens poverty (see Table 4). Although service providers agreed that corruption 
hinders democratic development, it is the least they think can be affected by corruption.Just like our findings, 
Seligson (2006) and Selamawit (2015) also found that corruption stalls economic growth. Seligson (2006) 
asserts that if corruption is the cause of poor economic performance, then anti-corruption programs become 
relevant to use to fight corruption unlike if it was the other way around. Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) and 
Ijewereme (2015) also support our finding that corruption interrupts a conducive environment for potential 
investors to invest in the economy of a country. It is imperative that corruption across all sectors is managed 
effectively considering that most of the firms in Zimbabwe rely on external investors for financing (Jambawo, 
2014) and those investments bolster economic growth of the country in return (Zivengwa et al., 2011). 
 
Table 4: Views of service providers on some of the most damaging effects of corruption 
 Mean of Likert 
scores 
p-value on statistical 
difference from 3 
Economic growth 1.55 0.000 
Scares potential investors from investing 1.57 0.000 
Increases cost of running businesses 1.73 0.000 
Distorts public expenditure 1.87 0.000 
Poor quality of service 1.87 0.000 
Worsens poverty 1.90 0.000 
Democratic development 2.47 0.000 
 
Forms of Corruption: Clients and service providers agreed with the statement that each identified type of 
corruption is common in the water sector. As shown in Table 5, the ANOVA test revealed that clients were 
strongly in agreement with the suggestion that bribery is a common type of corruption in the water sector 
since the mean score was found to be less than 2 and significantly below 3 (p value=0.000). Service providers 
were also in agreement with the suggestion that bribery is a common type of corruption in the water sector 
since a mean score of 2.14 was found to be significantly below 3. The ANOVA test also revealed that clients 
and service providers agreed with the suggestion that fraud, kick-backs, gifts and tips, embezzlement and 
institutionalised corruption are common types of corruption in the water sector since the mean scores were 
significantly below 3 (p value=0.000). 
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Table 5: Views of respondents on common types of corruption in the water sector 
 Clients  Service Providers  
 Mean of Likert 
scores 
p-value on 
statistical 
difference from 3 
Mean of 
Likert scores 
p-value on 
statistical 
difference from 3 
Bribery 1.68 0.000 2.14 0.000 
Fraud 2.03 0.000 2.26 0.000 
Institutionalized 2.19 0.000 2.00 0.000 
Kick-back 2.21 0.000 2.07 0.000 
Embezzlement 2.27 0.000 2.48 0.000 
Extortion 2.38 0.000 2.74 0.077 
Gifts and Tips 2.56 0.001 2.11 0.000 
 
A p-value well below 0.05 from the ANOVA test showed that clients viewed extortion as a common type of 
corruption in the water sector, but a p-value above 0.05 showed that service providers did not view extortion 
as a common type of corruption in the water sector. Similarly, Makumbe (2011) found that bribery is the 
most common form of corruption and extortion is the least form of corruption. Extortion is probably 
unpopular because it happens when service providers extract payments from unwilling clients (Gray& 
Kaufmann, 1998). Our findings on fraud differ with the findings by Selamawit (2015) in that a small 
proportion (3 percent) of their participants believe fraud is a recognised form of corruption in the water 
supply and sanitation sector in Ethiopia. In our sample, fraud was the second most common type of 
corruption in the water sector.Clients were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that bribery was 
most likely to occur in each identified situation in water service delivery. Mean scores less than 2 and p-
values much less 0.05 from the ANOVA test revealed that clients were strongly in agreement with the 
suggestion that bribery is most likely to occur when avoiding a water cut after failing to pay water bills, when 
speeding up a new connection and when speeding up a reconnection (see Table 6). A p-value less 0.05 from 
the ANOVA test revealed that clients agreed with the view that bribery is most likely to occur when there are 
service repairs. Sithole (2013) explained that employees in the public sector create delays to manufacture a 
crisis, which often leads to a bribe being paid by clients to speed up various processes or to get services. 
 
Table 6: Views of clients on when bribery is most likely to occur 
 Mean of Likert 
scores 
p-value on statistical 
difference from 3 
When avoiding water cut after failing to pay water bills 1.49 0.000 
When speeding up a new connection 1.92 0.000 
When speeding up reconnections 1.87 0.000 
When there are service repairs 2.73 0.022 
 
Strategies to Curb Corruption: Service providers were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed 
with the statement that each identified strategy was the most effective in curbing corruption and improving 
service delivery. Mean scores less than 2 and p-values much less 0.05 from the ANOVA test revealed that 
service providers strongly agreed with the suggestion that maintaining good ethical standards and good 
governance, auditing and improving systems and structures are the most effective strategies to curb 
corruption and improve service delivery. P-values less 0.05 from the ANOVA test showed that service 
providers agreed with the suggestion that implementing Information Technology, ensuring customers 
participate in decision making and, engaging NGOs and communities to monitor projects are effective 
strategies that can reduce corruption and improve service delivery (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Views of service providers on the most effective strategies 
 Mean of Likert 
scores 
p-value on statistical 
difference from 3 
Maintaining good governance and ethical standards 1.30 0.000 
Auditing 1.70 0.000 
Improving systems and structures 1.70 0.000 
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Implementing Information Technology 2.04 0.000 
Ensuring customers participate in decision making 2.17 0.000 
Engaging NGOs and communities to monitor projects 2.68 0.000 
 
The obstacles that staff face in fighting corruption effectively include lack of commitment, lack of combined 
effort by all stakeholders, nepotism, late payment of salaries, low salaries, kickbacks, fear of victimisation and 
lack of modern management systems as shown in Table 8. A summative content analysis revealed that lack of 
commitment was the major obstacle faced bystaff in eradicating corruption. Fear of victimisation and 
receiving kickbacks if you report, particularly senior persons, were also common challenges. 
 
Table 8: Factors which makes it difficult to fight corruption 
Lack of commitment Nepotism Kickbacks 
Lack of modern management systems Poor coverage of water services Compromised systems 
Late payment of salaries Low salaries Fear of victimisation 
Low morale at work Political interference Concealment of the act 
 
As shown in Figure 3, 79 percent of the service providers feel that the legal system in Zimbabwe must be 
helping to curb corruption. This finding is in line with the findings by Moyo (2012) who found that Zimbabwe 
has a concrete legal and constitutional framework to fight corruption but lacks the political will to address the 
problem. People do not hesitate to commit a crime if they know they can get away with it (Treisman, 2000). 
The Prevention of Corruption Act 1983 criminalises all forms of active and passive corruption in both the 
public and private sectors. This legislation punishes guilty agents through hefty fines, or imprisonment (Gan 
Integrity, 2017). Other legislations that deal with corruption offences include the Anti-Corruption 
Commission Act 2004 and the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Act 2004 (Chene, 2015). Given 
that Zimbabwe’s legal system is made up of common law, the country must be having lower corruption like 
other countries using the same system (Goel & Nelson, 2008). 
 
Figure 3: Views of Service Providers on Zimbabwe’s Legal System 
 
 
Service Delivery: Clients were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement that 
each identified factor was a cause for poor water service delivery. Clients were strongly in agreement with 
the view that lack of accountability, dilapidation in water infrastructure and failure to follow quality 
standards and laws are factors that cause poor service delivery in addition to corruption since Likert scores 
were less than 2 and p-values from the ANOVA test were well below 0.05 (see Table 9). 
 
 
 
21%
79%
Do you feel Zimbabwe's legal system helps to 
curb corruption?
No Yes
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Table 9: Views of clients on factors that cause poor water service delivery 
 Mean of Likert 
scores 
p-value on statistical 
difference from 3 
Lack of accountability and transparency 1.84 0.000 
Dilapidation in water infrastructure 1.95 0.000 
Not following quality standards and laws 1.99 0.000 
Low production 2.00 0.000 
Lack of planning 2.08 0.000 
Lack of regulation 2.23 0.000 
Economic challenges 2.30 0.000 
Lack of payments due to high water bills 2.31 0.000 
Political Interference 2.39 0.000 
Inadequate citizen participation 2.51 0.000 
Population growth 2.77 0.130 
Lack of employee capacity 2.78 0.063 
 
As shown in Table 9, clients agreed with the view that low production, lack of regulation, lack of planning, 
economic challenges, non-payment of water bills, political interference and inadequate citizenry participation 
are factors that cause poor service delivery in the water sector in addition to corruption since mean scores 
were found to be significantly below 3. On the other hand, clients were relatively neutral on the suggestion 
that population growth and lack of employee capacity are factors that cause poor water service delivery in 
addition to corruption since the mean scores were found not to be significantly below 3. 
 
5. Conclusion & Recommendations 
 
Limitations: The main limitation of this study is that it was only conducted on services users and staff in 
Harare. This may affect the generalizability of the results to other regions of Zimbabwe. Although the 
response rate for service users and service providers was relatively good (68 percent), it might have been 
better if the length of time required to fill in the questionnaires was not that long. 
 
Conclusion: The results on the research questions are revealed in this paragraph. Bribery is the most 
common type of corruption in the water sector, and it normally occurs when avoiding water cut after failing 
to pay a water bill, and when speeding up a reconnection or a new connection. Fraud, kick-back, 
institutionalised, embezzlement and gifts and tips are also popular in the water sector. The results revealed 
that poor governance, economic hardship, weak accountability, low salaries, employee dissatisfaction and 
political instability are risk factors of corruption in the water sector. Both clients and service providers do not 
view work pressure as a contributory factor of corruption. The results revealed that corruption has a negative 
effect on economic growth, potential investments, costs of running businesses, public expenditure, quality of 
service and the public’s well-being and prosperity. However, maintaining good ethical standards and good 
governance and improving systems and structures are effective strategies that can curb corruption and 
improve service delivery. Furthermore, implementing information technology and ensuring inclusivity in 
making decisions on water projects are strategies that can help manage corruption and improve service 
delivery. Service providers cited lack of commitment, lack of teamwork, nepotism, late payment of salaries, 
low salaries, kickbacks, fear of victimisation and lack of modern management systems as obstacles they face 
in fighting corruption effectively. 
 
The principal-agent theory and public choice theory are linked to the study findings because employees 
(agents) choose to undermine their organisation’s (principal) interest in pursuit of their interests by 
behaving corruptly (Booth, 2012). This behaviour does not only affect the principal, but it also discourages 
investorsfrom investing and slows theeconomic growth of the country. Apart from corruption, the results 
revealed that lack of accountability, dilapidation in water infrastructure and failure to follow quality 
standards and laws are also major factors causing poor water service delivery. Also, low production, lack of 
regulation, lack of planning, economic challenges, non-payment of water bills, political interference and 
inadequate citizenry participation are factors that cause poor service delivery in the water sector. Attempts to 
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improve water service delivery in Zimbabwe have been exacerbated by the water shortages that are 
prevalent in the country. This research found that water availability is poorer in high-density suburbs 
compared to western and northern suburbs. Overall, the average number of days that households do not have 
water is 11 days per month. Most suburbs in Harare do not have running water mostly on weekends due to 
either shortages or service repairs. 
 
Implications for Practice & Policy: Water service providers and local authorities across the country must 
put in place strong governance and accountability frameworks to minimiseand eradicate corruption practices 
by their employees.Service providers also need to address obstacles, such as poor teamwork, lack of 
commitment, nepotism, late payment of salaries, low salaries and fear of victimisation, that 
honourableemployees face in trying to fight corruption effectively. An incentive that rewards employees who 
show commitment to fight corruption might be worth introducing.Given that bribery is likely to happen when 
avoiding water cut off due to non-payment or when speeding up a new connection or reconnection, measures 
should be put in place to prevent this form of corruption from occurring. Measures may include anonymous 
hotlines where clients can phone to report such matters. These lines may be run by an audit firm to ensure 
accountability of reported cases and identity protection of whistleblowers.Employees should receive punitive 
punishmentfor violating company ethics and public laws on corruption. Policy makers must address the 
impediments that frustrate the Zimbabwean justice system indealing with corrupt officials. This should help 
reduce corruption across all sectors in the country and consequently attract the much-needed local and 
foreign investments. 
 
Recommendations: The availability of water should be the same across all the suburbs of Harare. Areas that 
do not have the provision of council water must urgently be prioritised to have a water service in place. Also, 
Zimbabwe needs to adjust its water bill rates in line with regional rates. High water bills are one of the 
reasons why service users struggle to pay water bills.ZINWA and HCC must improve their systems and 
structures, enhance their auditing process, and educate their staff on good ethical standards and good 
governance to effectively fight against corruption and improve water service delivery.ZINWA must closely 
work with Transparency International as a way of strengthening stakeholder collaboration in the fight 
against corruption. Councils are recommended to review their revenue collection systems and introduce 
efficient systems that boost revenue collection. This will enable the councils to effectively deal with cash flow 
problems that contribute to low salaries and late payment of salaries which have been highlighted as some of 
the determinants of corruption.Service providers must make use of mobile technology to promote citizenry 
participation in sharing ideas and making decisions on water sustainability.There is an urgent need to deal 
with corruption, improve transparency and accountability, improve water infrastructure, follow quality 
standards and laws and increase the production of water to improve service delivery. 
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